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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996) and this Court has pour-over jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant plaintiffs Rule 
60(b)(1) Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment when there was no showing of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect? 
"The trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on a motion for relief from 
judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), and its determination will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion." Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment in 
defendant's favor after permitting plaintiff a reasonable time to conduct further discovery 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f)? 
Appellate courts review a trial court's decision under Rule 56(f) "under the abuse 
of discretion standard" and "'will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of 
reasonability.'" Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (quoting State 
v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993)). Despite the fact that the decision at issue 
in this appeal was one under Rule 56(f), appellant has characterized the issue as a summary 
judgment question under Rule 56(c). If appellant's characterization were correct, this 
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Court would review the trial court's decision for correctness. See Mills v. Brody. 929 
P.2d 360, 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In any event, this Court "may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied 
upon by the trial court." Otsuka Elecs. v. Imaging Specialists. Inc.. 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
(c) . . . . The judgment sought shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
(f) Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons 
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken 
or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), (f). 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
2 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
This case presents a question of whether the trial court abused the broad discretion 
this Court affords it under Rules 56(f) and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
determining that appellants Attorneys' Title Guarantee Fund, Inc. ("ATGF") and Edward 
and Shanen Rollins (the "Rollinses") (collectively "Plaintiffs") completely failed to 
properly oppose summary judgment in appellee David Knudson's ("Knudson") favor on 
Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment, wrongful lien, and slander of title. Plaintiffs filed 
a complaint asserting these three claims against Knudson and others ("Other Defendants"), 
almost immediately thereafter, moved the trial court for summary judgment. By definition, 
it was Plaintiffs1 initial position there were no disputed facts. Thereafter Knudson filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment also claiming there were no disputed facts. In response, 
and contrary to their initial claim of no disputed facts, appellees sought more time for 
discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). The trial court denied Plaintiffs' 
summary judgment motion, and agreed to permit Plaintiffs to conduct discovery under Rule 
56(f) before ruling on Knudson's summary judgment motion. 
Several months passed, during which Plaintiffs conducted no discovery. 
Consequently, Knudson re-submitted his summary judgment motion for decision. In 
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response, Plaintiffs again requested a Rule 56(f) continuance, filing an affidavit identical 
to the affidavit they had filed months before. The trial court refused to grant this request 
and entered summary judgment in Knudson's favor finding, among other things, that 
Knudson's statement of undisputed facts was uncontroverted by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing the trial court should have granted them more 
discovery time under Rule 56(f). The trial court denied this motion ruling Plaintiffs had 
more than sufficient time in which to conduct sufficient discovery to oppose Knudson's 
motion. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's grant of summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed a flurry 
of discovery requests, pleadings, and affidavits with the court. Included in their pleadings 
was a motion for Relief from Judgment, filed under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), 
persisting with their claim that the trial court should have granted them more discovery 
time under Rule 56(f). In opposing this motion, Knudson moved to strike all of Plaintiffs' 
pleadings and affidavits directed at him, since the trial court had granted his summary 
judgment motion and he was no longer a party in the action. The trial court denied 
Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(1) motion and granted Knudson's Motion to Strike. 
Because there were claims remaining against the Other Defendants, Plaintiffs sought 
and obtained Rule 54(b) certification from the trial court, and filed a notice of appeal. 
This court rejected that appeal as not being properly certified, in response to Knudson's 
Rule 10 motion for summary disposition. Now apparently conceding their claims against 
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the Other Defendants had no merit, Plaintiffs caused their claims against the Other 
Defendants to be dismissed and filed another notice of appeal from what is not a final 
judgment. 
B. Statement of Facts 
On April 2, 1991, a $10,564.91 judgment (the "Judgment") was entered in Third 
District Court against Margaret Wendler Hill ("Hill") and in favor of Guaranty National 
Insurance Company ("Guaranty"). (R. 55) Hill owned a parcel of real property, located 
at 1159 South 900 West, Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Property"), which was subject to 
the lien created by the Judgment. (R. 18, 55) In August of 1991, Guaranty apparently 
agreed to release the Judgment lien. (R. 55) However, an actual release was never 
executed, nor was any release or satisfaction of the Judgment ever filed with the Third 
District Court or the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. (R. 19, 100, 112) 
In 1993, the Rollinses purchased the Property, with ATGF insuring the Rollins' 
tide. (R. 18-19) In July of 1995, Knudson purchased the Judgment from Guaranty. (R. 
216, 229) Having obtained an assignment of the Judgment, Knudson initiated a foreclosure 
action against the Property and, on September 19, 1995, recorded a notice of sheriffs levy 
against the Property. (R. 228) 
After receiving the notice of sheriffs levy, ATGF, as insurer of the Property's 
clean tide, entered a written contract with Knudson whereby ATGF purchased the 
Judgment in order to prevent execution of the sheriffs levy. (R. 233) Specifically, on 
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November 29, 1995, ATGF paid Knudson $10,564.91 for the amount of the Judgment, 
$700 for attorney's fees incurred by Knudson, and $250 for costs. (R. 233) In assigning 
the Judgment to ATGF, Knudson made no representations or warranties regarding the 
Judgment. (R. 112, 233) As during all other relevant times, there was no release or 
satisfaction of the Judgment on file with the Third District Court or the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office when Knudson purchased the Judgment, nor when he filed his 
foreclosure action, nor when he assigned the Judgment to ATGF. (R. 19, 100, 112) 
On August 21, 1996, ATGF and the Rollinses (collectively "Plaintiffs'9) filed an 
Amended Complaint naming Knudson as a defendant. (R. 16) In the Amended Complaint, 
ATGF and the Rollinses conceded that Guaranty "failed to file a release as to the 
Judgment, and on information and belief failed to inform defendant Knudson as to the 
existence of the release." (R. 19) The complaint sought an award of damages against 
Knudson for wrongful lien, slander of title, and assumpsit. (R. 22-24) 
On August 22, 1996, ATGF's counsel sent Knudson a letter informing him that "it 
appears* that the Property was previously released as to the Judgment. (R. 68) In this 
letter, ATGF demanded that Knudson reimburse ATGF for expenses it incurred in 
resolving Knudson's levy against the Property. (R. 68) The letter did not demand that 
Knudson correct a wrongful lien under former Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1,1 nor even allude 
1
 The wrongful lien notice requirement, as well as civil penalties for wrongful liens 
is now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 (1997) 
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to such a demand. (R. 68) In any event, Knudson no longer had authority to release any 
lien on the Property, having assigned the Judgment to ATGF the previous year. (R. 67) 
On December 20, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking 
judgment against Knudson for wrongful lien under former Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1. (R. 
51-58) Section 38-9-1 provided for damages against defendants who "willfully refuse[] to 
release or correct" the recording of wrongful liens "within 20 days from the date of 
written request from the owner or beneficial tide holder of the real property." Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-9-1 (1994). According to Plaintiffs, their August 22, 1996 letter to Knudson, 
which merely demanded reimbursement of monies expended, somehow constituted a 
section 38-9-1 request. (R. 56) Additionally, Plaintiffs claimed that Knudson "failed and 
refused to correct the damages" caused by his actions, but did not claim that Knudson 
willfully refused to release or correct the recording of any wrongful liens. (R. 56) 
On January 21, 1997, Knudson filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
a memorandum opposing Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and supporting his motion. 
(R. 94-114) In response, Plaintiffs requested a continuance, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to conduct additional discovery. (R. 127-29) On January 
30, 1997, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a Rule 56(f) affidavit informing the trial court of his 
intent to conduct further discovery concerning Knudson's dealings with Guaranty. (R. 
127-29) 
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On February 7, 1997, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, without prejudice. (R. 161). Over the next four months, Plaintiffs conducted 
no discovery. (R. 174) Consequently, Knudson filed a Renewed Motion to Submit for 
Decision, seeking a ruling on his cross-motion for summary judgment. (R. 168-170) In 
response, Plaintiffs' counsel filed another Rule 56(f) affidavit seeking additional time for 
discovery on May 28,1997. (R. 171-73) No new grounds for further delay were set forth 
for this request and, in fact, the affidavit's language tracked the language of the first Rule 
56(f) affidavit verbatim. (R. 127-29, 171-73) Based on Plaintiffs' complete dereliction 
in conducting the Rule 56(f) discovery requested and granted months earlier, the trial court 
granted Knudson's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 29, 1997. (R. 174, 80-82) 
Plaintiffs responded by filing a Motion for Reconsideration, insisting their second 
Rule 56(f) request entitled them to more discovery time before summary judgment was 
granted. (R. 176-78) The trial court denied this motion, ruling that "a more than 
sufficient amount of time has elapsed within which the plaintiff[s] could have conducted 
the discovery or obtained the affidavits that they claim were not available in January of 
1997, to oppose defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." (R. 186) The court noted 
that Plaintiffs' second Rule 56(f) affidavit was "almost identical in wording" to the first, 
and that Plaintiffs had completely failed to conduct any discovery. (R. 185-86) 
Ignoring the fact that the trial court had granted summary judgment in Knudson's 
favor and denied their Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiffs filed a flurry of discovery, 
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pleadings, and affidavits with the trial court, including a motion for relief from judgment 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (R. 189-250) In this motion, Plaintiffs 
confined their arguments to Rule 60(b)(1), which allows relief from judgment in the event 
of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." (R. 192-95) According to 
Plaintiffs, their counsel had engaged in excusable neglect in failing to conduct any 
discovery, and that affidavits filed long after the trial court granted summary judgment in 
Knudson's favor showed that summary judgment was inappropriate. (R. 193-95) 
In opposing Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion, Knudson also moved to strike all 
motions, discovery, and pleadings directed at him after his dismissal from the case. (R. 
259-64) The trial court granted Knudson's Motion to Strike and denied Plaintiffs' Rule 
60(b) motion. (R. 283-86) After unsuccessfully trying to appeal under a Rule 54(b) order, 
Plaintiffs dismissed their claims against the Other Defendants in the case for the purpose 
of making Knudson1 s summary judgment order final, and appealed again. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment because the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rules 60(b) or 56(f), and because the 
undisputed facts show that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs are not entitied to judgment on 
any of the causes of action they assert against Knudson. 
First, denying Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion based on their procedural neglect and 
claimed ignorance of the consequences of failure to timely complete, or even start, Rule 
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56(f) discovery was certainly not an abuse of discretion, as is required for reversal. 
Pursuant to their own original request, Plaintiffs were to have conducted a minimal amount 
of discovery from a single source and could not reasonably expect to indefinitely stall 
proceedings in the case. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion. 
Second, "the central issue" raised by Plaintiffs regarding the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in Knudson's favor is Plaintiffs' claim that they did not have adequate 
time to complete Rule 56(f) discovery. (R. 185) Plaintiffs take issue with the trial court's 
decision under Rule 56(f). This Court should review that decision under an abuse of 
discretion standard and decline to consider the affidavits filed by Plaintiffs after Knudson 
was already dismissed from the case. Under this standard of review, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling. It allowed a reasonable amount of time to the Plaintiffs to 
conduct the limited discovery they identified. No discovery having been done for many 
months, and after Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of any kind, the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion to grant Knudson's summary judgment motion on the 
basis of undisputed facts and in accordance with the law. 
Third, Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law. Recovery for 
unjust enrichment "is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject 
matter of the litigation." Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 
(Utah 1978). It is undisputed that a binding judgment assignment agreement covered the 
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subject matter of this litigation, and Plaintiffs consequently have no legal basis for 
asserting unjust enrichment. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs meet none of the statutory requirements for a wrongful lien claim. 
Knudson no longer claimed an interest in the subject property when Plaintiffs brought this 
claim and, during the time period in which he did claim an interest, Knudson had no legal 
notice that this interest was unfounded. Moreover, Knudson never received a valid written 
request to correct the recording of his interest, as is statutorily-required for a wrongful lien 
claim. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have shown none of the elements of slander of title. Knudson 
recorded a legitimate interest in the subject property, without malice, and no owner or 
beneficial interest holder of the property was ever harmed by Knudson's actions. 
Therefore, even under a general summary judgment standard of review and even 
considering Plaintiffs' untimely affidavits, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in Knudson's favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DENYING PLAINTIFFS' RULE 60(b) MOTION WAS PROPER, AND A 
VALID EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S BROAD DISCRETION. 
Because Plaintiffs failed to make a valid or even facial showing of mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiffs' 
Rule 60(b) motion was proper, reasonable, and certainly not an abuse of discretion. 
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Plaintiffs sought relief exclusively under subsection (1) of Rule 60(b), which delineates 
four specific bases under which a trial court may grant relief from judgment: "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Delay and 
"general procedural neglect" do not evince Rule 60(b)(1) grounds for relief. Heath v. 
Heath. 541 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1975). Likewise, a party's ignorance of the 
consequences of failure to timely comply with discovery requirements does not 
demonstrate excusable mistake, inadvertence, or neglect for Rule 60(b)(1) purposes. See 
Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52, 54-55 (Utah 1984). 
In support of their Rule 60(b)(1) claim, Plaintiffs insist they were unaware that the 
trial court would impose any time limit for Rule 56(f) discovery and that the consequences 
of complying with this time limit would be so dire. Apparently, Plaintiffs claim to have 
had the benefit of an unlimited amount of time to do the specific discovery they were 
required to identify under Rule 56(f). However, the trial court had already denied 
Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, granting them limited leave to conduct discovery 
under Rule 56(f). Plaintiffs certainly could not forestall the inevitable indefinitely, in the 
hopes of someday being able to meet their burden on summary judgment. Moreover, 
Plaintiffs' eleventh-hour submission of a copy of their previously-filed Rule 56(f) affidavit 
hardly qualifies as diligence in pursuing discovery-especially considering Plaintiffs' 
complete failure to conduct discovery before that time. 
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Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly denied Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(1) 
motion under any applicable standard of review. However, this decision was entirely 
within the trial court's purview and this Court "will not interfere with the trial court's 
broad discretion to rule on a 60(b) motion absent a showing of abuse of that discretion." 
Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. Inc.. 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In light of Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate any of Rule 60(b)(l)'s elements, the trial 
court's decision was certainly not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(1) motion. 
n. REFUSING TO PERMIT FURTHER DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 56(f) 
BEFORE RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER, AND A 
VALID EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION 
A. Plaintiffs Mischaracterize the Nature of the Trial Court's Decision 
In the guise of a general summary judgment challenge, Plaintiffs challenge the trial 
court's refusal to extend discovery under Rule 56(f), arguing the court should have 
considered evidence submitted long after Knudson was dismissed from the case. In 
February of 1997, the trial court was faced with cross-motions for summary judgment and 
Plaintiffs' request for additional discovery under Rule 56(f). The trial court denied 
Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, but granted their Rule 56(f) request, postponing 
ruling on Knudson's motion. Months later, having conducted no discovery, Plaintiffs 
again requested time for additional discovery under Rule 56(f). Because of the substantial 
time that had passed during which "no discovery ha[d] been conducted," the trial court 
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rejected this request and granted Knudson's summary judgment motion. (R. 174) In 
ruling on Plaintiffs' objection to this decision, the trial court noted that "the central issue 
raised in the objection is that plaintiff has not yet completed discovery." (R. 185) 
On appeal, Plaintiffs take no issue with the trial court's February 1997 summary 
judgment ruling. Instead, Plaintiffs contest the trial court's refusal to grant them more 
discovery time under Rule 56(f) on Knudson's summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs' Rule 
56 argument before this Court begins as follows: "Plaintiff submitted evidence and further 
pleadings sufficient not only to defeat the summary judgment, but in fact to obtain 
summary judgment as against Knudson." (Appellant's Br. at 15) Contrary to Plaintiffs' 
claims, this "evidence and further pleadings" had nothing to do with the merits of the case 
facing the trial court when it entered the decision at issue on appeal. Rather, this 
"evidence and further pleadings" was haphazardly put forth after the trial court had 
dismissed Plaintiffs1 claims against Knudson, and was eventually stricken by the trial 
court. 
In deciding Plaintiffs' challenge to the trial court's decision, this Court should 
address the decision's correct disposition. See, e.g.. Preston & Chambers. P.C. v. Koller. 
943 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("Although in form the court granted summary 
judgment, the substance of the order imposed a discovery sanction."). Plaintiffs contest 
the propriety of the trial court's refusal to extend discovery under Rule 56(f) and, to the 
extent they belatedly put forth affidavits and other evidence allegedly relating to the merits 
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of summary judgment, Plaintiffs are arguing the trial court should have allowed them to 
conduct discovery to obtain this evidence instead of denying their Rule 56(f) request and 
striking these matters from the record. 
In opposing summary judgment in Knudson's favor, Plaintiffs had the burden of 
coming forward with sufficient proof to support their claims, and not resting upon mere 
allegations or denials in their pleadings. See Hipwell v. IHC Hosps.. Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 
339 (Utah 1998). In February of 1997, Plaintiffs were unable to do this, so the trial court 
gave them more time pursuant to Rule 56(f). Months later, Plaintiffs had done nothing. 
The trial court thus denied tfieir second Rule 56(i) request and granted summary judgment 
in Knudson's favor. As pointed out above, any argument relying on this affidavit is 
essentially a contention that the trial court should have permitted further discovery under 
Rule 56(f). Thus, on appeal, Plaintiffs' challenge boils down to a challenge to the trial 
court's refusal to extend discovery for a second time under Rule 56(f). Accordingly, 
because the decision at issue comes under Rule 56(f), this court should review the trial 
court's ruling "under the abuse of discretion standard." Crossland Sav. v. Hatch. 877 
P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion Under Rule 56(f) 
An appellate court reviews three factors when considering whether a moving party's 
affidavit was sufficient to merit a rule 56(f) continuance: 
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"(1) Were the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f) 
affidavit 'adequate' or is the party against whom 
summary judgment is sought merely on a 'fishing 
expedition' for purely speculative facts after 
substantial discovery has been conducted without 
producing any significant evidence? (2) Was there 
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for 
the party against whom the summary judgment is 
sought to use discovery procedures, and thereby 
cross-examine the moving party? (3) If discovery 
procedures were timely initiated, was the 
non-moving party afforded an appropriate 
response?" 
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations 
omitted). 
Ironically, Plaintiffs1 initial position and claim in their own motion for summary 
judgment was that there were no disputed facts in this case. Ostensibly that claim was 
made in compliance with Rule 11. Nevertheless, the reasons articulated in Plaintiffs' first 
Rule 56(f) affidavit were deemed adequate to receive a continuance, and the trial court 
accordingly granted one. However, when the trial court denied Plaintiffs' second Rule 
56(f) request, substantial time had elapsed during which Plaintiffs had produced no 
significant evidence, nor any discovery at all for that matter. Accordingly, and 
particularly after Plaintiffs had initially claimed there were no disputed facts, it was 
entirely reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Plaintiffs were "merely on a 'fishing 
expedition' for purely speculative facts." 
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Additionally, there was more than sufficient time since the inception of the 
proceedings for Plaintiffs to use discovery procedures. In his Rule 56(f) affidavit, all of 
the information Plaintiffs' counsel alleged he could obtain through discovery was to come 
from one source: Guaranty. (R. 142) Plaintiffs had close to four months to obtain all 
necessary discovery from a single source. Hence, Plaintiffs had abundant time to engage 
in discovery and chose instead to do nothing. Under these circumstances it was entirely 
reasonable, and certainly not an abuse of discretion, for the trial court to deny Plaintiffs' 
second request for extended discovery under Rule 56(f). Therefore, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's decision refusing to extend discovery under Rule 56(f). Doing so 
will remove any need to address Plaintiffs' arguments based on their post-summary 
judgment pleadings and affidavits. 
III. KNUDSON WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Even if Plaintiffs properly raised the propriety of summary judgment in Knudson's 
favor in this appeal, reversal would still be inappropriate. The undisputed facts 
demonstrate that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have no claim for unjust enrichment, 
wrongful lien, or slander of title. 
A. Unjust Enrichment and Restitution Have No Application to This Case 
ATGF and Knudson had an express contract by which Knudson sold his rights in 
the Judgment to ATGF. Consequently, unjust enrichment does not lie. "Contract implied 
in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust enrichment, is one branch of quantum 
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meruit. A quasi-contract is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution." 
Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added). In fact, 
"[r]ecovery under quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract 
exists." IdL at 268. In other words, "[rjecovery in quasi contract is not available where 
there is an express contract covering die subject matter of die litigation." Mann v. 
American Western Life Ins. Co.. 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978). 
Knudson and ATGF had an express, valid, and binding contract for me purchase 
of the Judgment. Both parties fully performed their obligations under the Agreement, wim 
ATGF paying Knudson an agreed-upon sum, and Knudson assigning die Judgment to 
ATGF~wim no warranties as to die Judgment's validity. In die face of die express 
contract covering me subject matter of mis litigation, Plaintiffs claim mat Knudson is 
somehow liable for unjust enrichment, entiding ATGF to restitution.2 (Appellants' Br. at 
16-17) In reality, any unjust enrichment claim by ATGF presupposes mat no enforceable 
2
 In support of mis fallacy, Plaintiffs cite Utah State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Toscano. 624 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1981). In Toscano. me defendant made 
misrepresentations in an application for financial assistance from a government agency 
wim whom the defendant had no contractual relationship. See id. at 1157. 
Accordingly, Toscano has no application to mis case. Plaintiffs also cite me 
Restatement of Restitution as somehow obligating this Court to recognize a restitution 
claim between parties to a valid contract. While me Restatement may provide guidance 
for restitution claims between noncontracting parties, Utah case law mandates mat 
restitution for unjust enrichment is unavailable where an express contract covers the 
litigation's subject matter. 
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written or oral contract exists and, because an enforceable contract between ATGF and 
Knudson does exist, recovery for unjust enrichment is not available. 
Additionally, to recover restitution under an unjust enrichment claim, " '[t]here must 
be some misleading act, request for services, or the like, to support such an action.'" 
Knight v. Post. 748 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted). Knudson 
sold and ATGF purchased an assignment of the Judgment based on the parties' mutual belief 
that the Judgment was valid and subsisting, after having investigated the matter3 and in 
reliance on presumptions afforded by law.4 Knudson made no representations regarding the 
Judgment's validity or enforceability. ATGF, a title insurance company, was in as good a 
position to verify these matters as was Knudson and there was thus no misleading act to 
support Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. Therefore, to the extent it even considers the 
propriety of summary judgment in Knudson's favor, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment against Plaintiffs on their unjust enrichment claim. 
3
 As previously noted, no release or satisfaction of the Judgment was recorded with 
the Third District Court or the Salt Lake County Recorder's office when the parties 
entered the Agreement. 
4
 The Judgment itself was a recorded document. Pursuant to Utah statute: 
A recorded document creates the following presumptions regarding title to the real 
property affected: 
(a) the document is genuine and was executed voluntarily by the person 
purporting to execute it; 
(f) the grantee, transferee, or beneficiary of an interest created or described by 
the document acted in good faith at all relevant times 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l) (1994). 
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B. Plaintiffs Meet None of the Statutory Requirement for a Wrongful Lien 
Claim 
The trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' wrongful lien claim. When the trial court 
entered summary judgment in Knudson's favor, Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute provided that: 
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or 
encumbrance against, real property, who causes or 
has caused a document asserting that claim to be 
recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder, 
who knows or has reason to know that the document 
is forged, groundless, or contains a material 
misstatement or false claim, is liable to the owner or 
title holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, 
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney 
fees, and costs as provided for in this chapter, if he 
willfully refuses to release or correct such document 
of record within 20 days from the date of written 
request from the owner or beneficial title holder of 
the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (1994). Hence, for Knudson to be liable for the filing of a 
wrongful lien, this provision required that he: (1) claimed an interest in the Property; (2) 
recorded a document asserting this interest with the county recorder knowing or having 
reason to know that the document was unfounded; and (3) willfully refused to release or 
correct the recording of the document within 20 days of receiving a written request from the 
Rollinses to do so. see id. The undisputed facts contained in the pleadings, discovery, and 
affidavits on file when the trial court granted summary judgment conclusively demonstrate 
that Plaintiffs meet none of these requirements. 
20 
First, when Plaintiffs first asserted their wrongful lien claim in August of 1996, and 
at all relevant times thereafter, Knudson no longer claimed any interest in the Property. 
During the entire time Knudson owned the Judgment, and thus had a claim against the 
Property, no request to correct the recording of this interest was ever made. Instead, 
Plaintiffs waited almost an entire year after Knudson had assigned the Judgment to ATGF 
to assert a wrongful lien claim. This begs the question of what ATGF hoped to accomplish 
by asserting Knudson was claiming a wrongful interest in the Property when ATGF itself 
had purchased, and thus asserted this very interest the previous year. 
Second, Knudson did not know or have reason to know that any interest he asserted 
in the Property was unfounded. At no time was there a release or satisfaction of the 
Judgment on file with the Third District Court or the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. 
Knudson, like ATGF or any other purchaser of the Judgment, was legally entitled to rely 
on this lack of recording and assume the Judgment was genuine and entered in good faith. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-4a-4(l) (1994). Plaintiffs belabor statements made in an 
affidavit, filed well after the trial court had cut off Rule 56(f) discovery and granted 
summary judgment, indicating that a Guaranty employee made statements to Knudson 
denoting the existence of a release of the Judgment. However, the Judgment was a 
recorded document, legally entitled to a presumption of validity. The release agreement 
was not. In the course of resolving a judgment's execution, parties may negotiate, enter, 
and re-negotiate any number of full or partial release agreements. Such agreements are 
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not valid as to third parties, like Knudson, until they are recorded. Thus, to the extent this 
affidavit is even properly before this Court,5 it does not demonstrate knowledge for section 
38-9-Ts purposes. 
Finally, Knudson did not willfully refuse to release or correct a wrongful recording 
within 20 days of receiving a written request to do so. As noted above, when Plaintiffs 
asserted their wrongful lien claim, Knudson no longer owned the Judgment, and thus had 
no claim on the Property. Upon purchasing the Judgment from Knudson, ATGF had 
complete and exclusive legal right to release the notice of sheriffs levy on the Property. 
Finally, Knudson never received a written request to release or correct a document. 
Plaintiffs claim that ATGF's August 21, 1996 letter to Knudson constituted such a written 
request. (Appellants' Br. at 18). However, in this letter, ATGF merely demanded that 
Knudson reimburse it for expenses it incurred. (R. 68) The letter did not demand that 
Knudson correct a wrongful lien under former Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, nor even allude 
to such a demand. (R. 68) Also, this letter was written on behalf of ATGF, who was not 
the owner or beneficial title holder of the Property. (R. 68) Therefore, Knudson did not 
"willfully refuse to release or correct [a] document of record within 20 days from the date 
of written request from the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property" under 
5
 The affidavit was stricken from the record, along with all of Plaintiffs' other 
affidavits filed after the trial court cut off Rule 56(f) discovery. As pointed out above, 
any argument relying on this affidavit is essentially a contention that the trial court 
should have permitted further discovery under Rule 56(f). 
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section 38-9-1 because he had no authority to effectuate such a release, nor did he receive 
a request to do so from the appropriate parties. 
C. Plaintiffs Have Shown None of the Elements of Slander of Title 
The trial court properly dismissed the slander of title claim. "To prove slander of 
title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was a publication of a slanderous statement 
disparaging claimant's tide, (2) the statement was false, (3) the statement was made with 
malice, and (4) the statement caused actual or special damages." First Sec. Bank v. 
Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253, 1256-57 (Utah 1989). The undisputed facts contained 
in the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits on file when the trial court granted summary 
judgment unequivocally show that Plaintiffs have met none of these requirements. 
The first element of a slander of tide claim requires a showing of "a publication of 
a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title." Id. (emphasis added). For obvious 
reasons, parties who "never had tide to the property in question" categorically fail to meet 
this requirement. Gillmor v. Cummings. 904 P.2d 703, 705 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
While it provided title insurance on the Property, ATGF does not, nor did it ever, hold any 
interest whatsoever in the Property itself. This distinction belongs to the Rollinses, who 
have neither pled nor suffered any actual or special damages due to Knudson's assertions 
of claims against the Property. 
The Utah Supreme Court has "unequivocally stated that 'presumed or general 
damages' are insufficient in a slander of tide action. 4A slander of tide action requires 
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proof of actual or special damages.' The special damage rule requires the plaintiff to 
establish pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated . . . . ' " Valley Colour. Inc. 
v. Beuchert Builders. Inc.. 944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). While at 
most, Knudson's assertion of claims to the Property based on the judgment may have 
temporarily clouded the title to the Rollinses' property, ATGF purchased an assignment of 
the Judgment before the Rollinses incurred any damage whatsoever. If an ongoing lien 
against their property is actionable, that action now lies against ATGF. 
Moreover, when Knudson recorded the notice of sheriffs levy against the Property, 
any interest claimed thereby was completely legitimate, not false as required to prove 
slander of title. As pointed out numerous times in this brief, at no time was a release or 
satisfaction of the Judgment ever filed with the Third District Court or Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office and Knudson was legally entitled to lely on the Judgment's validity as 
a recorded document. Hence, any recorded statement made by Knudson claiming an 
interest in the Property was not false. 
For this and other reasons, Knudson also did not act with malice as is required to 
show slander of title. Absent affirmative proof of an intent to injure, vex, or annoy, 
"malice" for slander of tide purposes requires that "a party knowingly and wrongfully 
records or publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or misleading 
impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that it should reasonably foresee 
might result in damage to the owner of the property." Banberry Crossing. 780 P.2d at 
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1257. As demonstrated above, Knudson filed a lien against the Property based on the 
Judgment, a legitimate recorded document with no recorded satisfaction or release. Thus, 
the interest claimed in Knudson's lien was not untrue or spurious and Knudson did not act 
with malice.6 
Once again, Plaintiffs dwell on statements in their late-filed affidavit of a Guaranty 
employee indicating Knudson knew of a release of the judgment. To the extent this Court 
should even consider it, this affidavit fails to demonstrate malice. Malice is not proven 
where the filing of a false notice "was inadvertent rather than calculated." IcL Knudson 
verified that no release or satisfaction of the Judgment was recorded with either the Third 
District Court or the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. Under these circumstances, 
failing to investigate allegations made in passing by a Guaranty employee before filing his 
lien was, at best, inadvertence-not a calculated recording of a false statement. Therefore, 
Knudson's actions did not constitute malice as required by section 38-9-1 and this Court 
should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in Knudson's favor. 
6
 Plaintiffs insist that this case is analogous to Gillmor v. Cummings. 904 P.2d 
703, 707-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), in which the court found malice based on the 
defendant's access to records controverting his asserted interest in the property at issue. 
(Appellant's Br. at 21) However, the "records" in Gillmor were "deeds and 
descriptions," presumably recorded with the county recorder. IsL at 708. In contrast, 
the alleged but undocumented release of the Judgment was obviously never recorded 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder or the Third District Court. Further, there is 
nothing to suggest Knudson ever had access to it, if it exists. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's refusal to grant Plaintiffs relief from summary judgment under 
Rule 60(b)(1) based on Plaintiffs' inexcusable delay and procedural neglect was not an 
abuse of discretion. Likewise, the trial court's decision to rule on summary judgment 
rather than grant Plaintiffs more discovery time was also not an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's rulings under Rules 56(f) and 60(b), 
without reference to Plaintiffs' untimely and now stricken affidavits. 
Moreover, even considering the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, the undisputed facts 
conclusively demonstrate that Knudson was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. The existence of a contract and the validity of Knudson's actions legally preclude 
Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. Moreover, Plaintiffs failure to comply with Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-9-1 precludes their wrongful lien claim. Finally, the undisputed facts show that 
Knudson filed no false statement, did not act with malice, and that the Property's owner, 
the Rollinses, suffered no damages. Hence, summary judgment in Knudson's favor on 
Plaintiffs' slander of title claim was appropriate as a matter of law. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in Knudson's favor, and remand this matter to the trial court with 
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instructions that the trial court order the Plaintiffs to pay Knudson's costs incurred herein. 
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